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THE “FAMILY”—AND
“FAMILIES” IN LAW:
A REVIEW OF ARCHANA PARASHAR
AND FRANCESCA DOMINELLO,
THE FAMILY IN LAW
Mary Jane Mossman*
Once upon a time, things were easy for
family lawyers. Their object of study was
clearly marked out (marriage, divorce, and
their consequences), while theoretical debate
about the subject was rare or non-existent.
Although it is difficult to locate this Garden
of Eden in real time, most family lawyers
would share the perception that things have
become more complex of late. . . . [And]
allied to this, there has been an explosion of
theoretical interest in law and the family.1
Two decades after this assessment by John Dewar,
The Family in Law offers a significant and sophisticated
appraisal of the law’s engagement “in the construction of
ideas about the family and familial relationships”.2 The
authors’ basic premise is that legal analysis continues to
utilize a limited conception of “the family”, one that
*

Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School.

1

John Dewar, “Family, Law and Theory” (1996) 16:4 Oxf J Leg Stud
725 at 725. See also David Morgan, Family Connections: An
Introduction to Family Studies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

2

Archana Parashar & Francesca Dominello, The Family in Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 2.
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emphasizes the nuclear family as the norm, thereby
contributing to an assumption that “family” is primarily “a
private institution whose main function is to provide
economic and emotional support” for its members. More
specifically, the authors suggest that lawyers, judges and
legal academics all tend to engage in legal reasoning that,
subtly or otherwise, reifies “the nuclear family” as the
normative ideal, even in the context of clear evidence of
many different family forms.3 Thus, the authors’ goal is to
critique how “family law functions in ways that preserve
the nuclear family and continue to perpetuate heterosexual
normativity, cultural bias, age, sex, class hierarchies, and
the sexual division of labour within and outside the
family.”4 In doing so, moreover, the authors attempt to
“challenge the conventional boundaries of family law” in
legal textbooks to reveal how “the law [especially in the
courts] makes explicit choices in regulating family life.”5
Thus, their analysis suggests that “family law constructs
discourses about families in a way that hierarchies found
in contemporary society are maintained rather than
challenged.”6
Although The Family in Law focuses on “family
law” in Australia, it offers a thoughtful analysis for
lawyers, judges and legal academics in Canada as well,
since many of the same challenges are evident in both
jurisdictions. For example, Bill C-78 was introduced by
Canada’s Minister of Justice in the House of Commons on
3

Ibid at 2–3.

4

Ibid at 3.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid at 4 [emphasis added].
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22 May 2018, with a number of significant proposals to
amend the substance and process of divorces (and
including additional amendments to other federal statutes
as well). For example, Bill C-78 includes proposals to
replace the terminology of custody and access with
terminology related to parenting; establish a nonexhaustive list of criteria for determining “the best interest
of the child;” create duties for parties and legal advisors to
encourage the use of family dispute resolution processes;
introduce measures to assist courts to address family
violence; establish a framework regarding the relocation of
a child; and simplify processes such as those related to
family support obligations.7
In the context of proposed reforms in Canada, it
seems significant that the federal government in Australia
had also announced a comprehensive review of Australia’s
Family Law Act8 in September 2017, to be undertaken by
the Australian Law Reform Commission. The Review’s
terms of reference recognized the “profound social changes
to the needs of families” since the 1970s (when the
Australian Family Law Act was first enacted), including the
greater diversity of family structures, the importance of
ensuring that the FLA meets the needs of contemporary
families and individuals, and the importance of public

7

Bill C-78, An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and
Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment,
Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential
amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, Explanatory
Notes (first reading 22 May 2018).

8

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 1975/53 [FLA].
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confidence in the family law system.9 More specifically,
the terms of reference directed an exploration of some of
the same issues included in Bill C-78 in Canada: for
example, the importance of dignity and privacy for
separating families, the need to encourage dispute
resolution early, the importance of protecting children of
separating families, the pressures (including financial
pressures) on family law courts, and the benefits of
engaging appropriately skilled professionals. In assessing
appropriate reforms, moreover, the Review will consider
“the appropriate, early and cost-effective resolution of all
family law disputes;” “whether the adversarial court
system offers the best way to support the safety of families
and resolve matters;” and the possibility of devising
opportunities for less adversarial resolution of parenting
and property disputes.10 Thus, in both the Australian and
Canadian contexts, significant reform proposals
concerning families and law are currently underway.
Although some aspects of these reforms focus on
substantive issues, it appears that process concerns may be
paramount in both jurisdictions: the search for cheaper,
faster settlements that do not require courts and judges.
By contrast, a primary critique for the authors of
The Family in Law is the need to recognize that family law
should not be understood as merely a dispute resolution
9

Attorney-General for Australia, News Release, “First Comprehensive
Review of the Family Law Act” (27 September 2017), online: Media
Releases
<www.pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/21248/201711010244/www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2017/ThirdQ
uarter/First-comprehensive-review-of-the-family-law-act-27September-2017.html>.

10

Ibid.
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mechanism for private parties. In posing these challenges
for family law, moreover, the authors explore whether the
concept of justice, which traditionally operates in the
“public” sphere, should be extended to the “private” sphere
of the family. They conclude that this issue requires
attentiveness not only to goals of gender equality but also
to the needs of the many families that do not conform to
the nuclear family model.11 In addition, the authors note the
irony that family law supports an ideology of love,
altruism, and personal fulfilment when a family
relationship is formed and while it continues; however, “at
the end of the very same relationship it adopts another
stand—that family law is no more than a dispute resolution
mechanism. . . . It does not wish to know anything about
messy emotions, sacrifices or altruism.”12 In this way,
family law manages to appear to be value-neutral:
ADR is often presented to consumers as
cheaper, more time efficient and providing
better access to justice in contrast to
litigation, but even if these claims are true the
issue for us as legal thinkers is how
conducive it is to achieving a fair family law.
. . . [While the Family Law Act promotes
autonomy and privacy, reinforcing the family
as a private institution,] ADR reproduces a
range of social hierarchies that come together
11

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 21–25, citing Susan Moller Okin,
Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Will
Kymlicka, “Rethinking the Family” (1991) 20:1 Philos Public Aff 77.

12

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 27, citing Carol Smart, The Ties
that Bind: Law, Marriage, and the Reproduction of Patriarchal
Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
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and function to legitimise gender hierarchies
that exist in the nuclear family form [as well
as hierarchies of class, race and sexuality that
exist in society].13
Thus, applying their argument that legal knowledge
is inevitably constructed, the authors explain how theory is
essential to the creation of a just family law; that is,
lawyers, judges, and academics must always “make
choices about the categories of analysis,” and the issues
and the way to analyse them: for example, whether to
promote gender justice goals in family disputes, as opposed
to merely improving the cost and time efficiency of the
family law system. In this way, they conclude that
“responsibility for our ideas lies with us.”14
[A]ny analysis of family law needs to address
the question of whether reform to the
substantive law has the potential to transcend
the inequities that exist between men, women
and children, and for people of different
sexualities, cultures and socioeconomic
backgrounds in contemporary social
13

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 60. See also Rosemary Hunter,
“Adversarial Mythologies: Policy Assumptions and Research
Evidence in Family Law” (2003) 30:1 JL & Soc'y 156.

14

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 29–30. The authors engage with
ideas in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-77, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980) to explore the need to embrace theory in family
law. See also David Sugarman, “Legal Theory, the Common Law
Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition” in William Twining,
ed, Legal Theory and Common Law (New York: Basil Blackwell,
1986) at 26.
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arrangements. . . . [A] study of family law
provides a good opportunity to illustrate the
relationships between the law, society and the
state, and insight on how family law could be
different.15
In critiquing the law’s positivist account of its rules
as objective and value-free, the authors engage with
interdisciplinary scholarship to explore three fundamental
themes: the diversity of family forms, the sexual division
of labour, and the public/private divide. In the authors’
view, family law should not be understood as merely a
dispute resolution mechanism for private parties.16
The Family in Law offers a comprehensive
overview of contemporary issues about “family law” in
Australia. The authors are scrupulous in providing details
of statutes and cases relating to marriage (and marriagelike relationships), divorce, financial relations, spousal
maintenance, private ordering of financial relations (family
contracts), disputes about children, children’s roles in court
proceedings; child maintenance and support (including
social security); regulation of families (abortion and child
protection); and adoption and reproductive technologies.
Yet, at the same time, their exploration of these issues
15

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 11.

16

The book’s second chapter focuses on family law institutions,
including the Family Court of Australia, which has jurisdiction in all
the states and territories as a result of the assignment of family law
matters to the federal government pursuant to Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), 1900, s 51. Issues about child
protection and family violence, however, are part of the jurisdiction of
states and territories.
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includes rigorous attentiveness to underlying policy issues,
which are assessed in terms of wide-ranging legal and
interdisciplinary scholarship and engaged critique—
especially in relation to the themes identified earlier: the
law’s narrow focus on the nuclear family, the inequities of
the sexual division of labour, and the need to reconsider the
public/private spheres in the family law context. Overall,
the book provides a detailed and engaged assessment of
contemporary issues about the family in law, especially in
relation to fundamental theories about the role of law in
society and the need to incorporate interdisciplinary
scholarship to achieve better outcomes in law. In this way,
the book offers solid and persuasive arguments that create
new ways of understanding the problems and potential of
law for families in the twenty-first century.
For Canadian lawyers, judges, and academics and
their students, three subjects appear particularly relevant.
One is the extent to which the authors explore challenges
of diversity in families, focusing particularly on race and
sexuality. In relation to marriage, for example, the book
focuses on the limited recognition of Aboriginal customary
marriages, and how embedded assumptions about marriage
as monogamous resulted in a recommendation by the
Australian Law Reform Commission for only limited
recognition of customary marriages (some of which are
polygamous). The authors challenge this limitation,
concluding that “treating [the concept of monogamous
marriage] as unchangeable in the process of ‘recognising’
another familial arrangement, should be seen as an exercise
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of power rather than a mere description of a natural state of
affairs.”17
Similarly, the authors critique the High Court’s
decision in 2013 in Commonwealth v. Australian Capital
Territory concerning same-sex marriage.18 Although the
federal Marriage Act included recognition of only
opposite-sex marriages, the High Court concluded that this
federal statute nonetheless “covered the field”, so that a
statute enacted by the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
to permit same-sex marriages in its Territory was ultra
vires—in spite of intransigence on the part of the federal
Parliament to amend the Marriage Act to achieve greater
inclusivity. The authors argued that the omission of samesex marriage in the federal Act could have permitted the
High Court to acknowledge a “gap”, (that is, that the
federal Act did not cover the field), thereby validating the
ACT statute. Moreover, as they noted, the High Court’s
decision failed to mention that the same-sex marriages,
which had been performed pursuant to the ACT statute,
were rendered void by its decision, thus resulting in
17

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 47–49. The book also includes
extensive discussion about child custody determinations involving
Aboriginal children in Chapter 9, especially the Australia, Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home:
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander children from their Families (1997), online
<www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/bringing-them-home-report1997>. In addition, there is discussion in Chapter 11 about child
welfare and Aboriginal children, including the over-representation of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in care, at 399–404.
Many of these issues resonate with similar challenges in Canada.

18

Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, [2013] HCA 55, 250
CLR 441.
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discrimination on the basis of sexuality.19 In all of these
cases, of course, the authors emphasized how legal
approaches to the (lack of full) recognition of “other”
family forms reinforces the primacy of the nuclear family
in law. Moreover, while same-sex marriage was eventually
recognized by Canada’s federal Parliament in 2005, and
customary Aboriginal marriages have achieved recognition
for some purposes in Canadian provinces, the patchwork
of legal rights and responsibilities for transgender persons
and cohabiting adults in “family” relationships continue to
create challenges for some Canadian families.20
A second way in which this book opens up new
ways of thinking about family law matters is in its
treatment of child support issues, and particularly the need
to take into account broader societal arrangements, that is,
by extending the boundaries of “family law”. Chapter 10
focuses on the how federal statutes concerning child
19

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 49–51. The authors also argue that
an expanded definition of “marriage” in federal legislation could also
include “de facto” (cohabiting) relationships at 51–52.

20

In relation to same-sex marriage, see Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c
33 and Mark D Walters, “Incorporating Common Law into the
Constitution of Canada: Egale v Canada and the Status of Marriage”
(2003) 41:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. In relation to Aboriginal customary
marriages, see Bradford Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family Law and the
Canadian Legal System” (1980) 8:2 Am Indian L Rev 199. Ontario
enacted the Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment
Because of Gender Identity or Gender Expression, 2012, SO 2012, c
7; and gender identity is included as a protected ground of
discrimination in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and the Northwest
Territories. However, the law affecting cohabitees differs across
Canada: see Robert Leckey, “Cohabitation and Comparative Method”
(2009) 72:1 Mod L Rev 48.
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support obligations and their administrative arrangements
reflect how “the discourse of neoliberalism has translated
into the context of private responsibility for the child”; as
well, the authors critique how child support provisions
“normalise the idea of the nuclear family as the ideal form
of family, but in a way that promotes parenting as a genderneutral activity, which fails to account for the reality of the
effects of the sexual division of labour.”21 Of course, these
critiques about child support arrangements (and their
inevitable links to needed spousal maintenance)22 have also
been voiced in Canada.23 What is particularly significant
for this book, however, is its effort to assess these “private”
family support obligations in the larger context of the
“public” social security system in Australia. According to
the authors, there is an “urgent need to refocus the issue on
the social responsibility for child support rather than
making it a (private) primary responsibility of the poorest
mothers and fathers in our society.”24
The book includes analysis of governmental
inquiries and reform processes that resulted in the current
21

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 334.

22

Ibid. See also Margaret Harrison, “Continuous Parenting and the Clean
Break: The Aftermath of Marriage Breakdown” (1988) 23:3 Austl J
Social Issues 208; Regina Graycar, “Towards a Feminist Position of
Maintenance” (1987) Refractory Girl: A Women’s Studies Journal 7;
and Margrit Eichler, “The Limits of Family Law Reform” (1990) 7 Can
Fam LQ 59.

23

Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law and Women’s Work (Don Mills,
Ont: Oxford University Press, 2003).

24

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 354. See also Mary Jane Mossman,
“‘Running Hard to Stand Still’: The Paradox of Family Law Reform”
(1994) 17:1 Dalhousie LJ 5.
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arrangements for child support, focusing particularly on the
invocation of the “shared parenting” principle for which
there was scant evidence in family “practices”.25 Indeed,
there are also arguments that suggest that the stated goals
of child support reforms (reducing child poverty and
reducing the cost to the state for children following their
parents’ separation) have not been met.26 In addition, the
authors suggest that the needs of lone mothers are
completely unrecognized because of law’s preference for
the nuclear family:
The ‘clean break’ philosophy in family law is
that the parties should fend for themselves
after relationship breakdown. If that is not
possible, the law provides for ongoing
maintenance. The idea is to contain the cost
of relationship breakdown between the
parties. This approach treats social welfare as
a last resort measure. [However,] socialwelfare provisions also play a significant role
25

See Helen Rhoades & Susan Boyd, “Reforming Custody Laws: A
Comparative Study” (2004) 18:2 Int'l JL Pol'y & Fam 119; Rhoades,
“Posing as Reform: The Case of the Family Law Reform Act” (2000)
14:2 Austl J Fam L 142; Kay Cook & Kristin Natalier, “Selective
Hearing: The Gendered Construction and Reception of Inquiry
Evidence” (2014) 34:4 Crit Soc Pol’y 515. The authors also reference
a comparative study, which highlighted how Australia’s formal equal
opportunity policy in education and employment was not replicated in
families with children where traditional gender roles were reinforced:
Lyn Craig & Killian Mullan, “Parenthood, Gender and Work-Family
Time in the United States, Australia, Italy, France and Denmark”
(2010) 72:5 J Marriage Fam 1344.

26

See Belinda Fehlberg et al, Australian Family Law: The Contemporary
Context, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 424–25.
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in legitimising gender inequalities, while also
entrenching other social hierarchies of class
and race.27
Perhaps because of the different constitutional
arrangements in Canada, where financial provision for
spouses and children at family breakdown—as well as
employment insurance and social welfare—are sometimes
shared/sometimes exclusive responsibilities of either the
federal and provincial governments, Canadian family law
most often does not extend its boundaries to detailed
examination of relationships between “private” family
support and “public” entitlements to social security—even
though these relationships are often critical concerns for
alleviating financial dependency in families.28 In this way,
the focus on relationships between “family” support and
“societal” support in The Family in Law points to an
27

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 363. The authors explain how
neoliberal ideology suggests that cutting welfare costs will generate
economic growth and employment, and that the New Right has often
been embraced by fathers’ rights groups. For many in these groups, the
goal is that “women should be forced to be financially reliant on men,”
and this reliance should be linked to the traditional family unit: ibid at
364–65. See also Miranda Kaye & Julie Tolmie, “Fathers’ Rights
Groups in Australia and their Engagement with Issues in Family Law”
(1998) 12:1 Austl J Fam L 19.

28

For examples, see Mary Jane Mossman, “Conversations about
Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are there ‘Lessons’ for
the United States?” (2003) 32:1 Hofstra L Rev 171; Mossman, “Child
Support or Support for Children? Re-Thinking the ‘Public’ and
‘Private’ in Family Law” (1997) 46 UNBLJ 63; and Mossman,
“Family Law and Social Assistance: Rethinking Equality” (with
Morag MacLean) in Patricia Evans & Gerda Wekerle, eds, Women and
the Canadian Welfare State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997) 117.
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economic reality that deserves much more attention in both
Canada and Australia.
A third aspect of this book of some significance to
Canada is Chapter 5, which focuses on property relations
at family breakdown. As the authors suggest at the outset,
the “most significant legal reform in the family laws of
western states has been the granting of a share of property
to the financially dependent spouse, usually the wife.”29 At
the same time, the authors argue that there is a “disjuncture
between the law’s discourse on marriage as a partnership
and the unequal gendered financial consequences of
[family] breakdown”; according to the authors, this
disjunction occurs because of “the concepts of nuclear
family, family as a private institution, and the claims of
family law as merely intended to provide a neutral dispute
resolution mechanism.”30 Subsection 79(2) of the Family
Law Act in Australia requires a court to adjust title to
spouses’ property interests only if it is “just and equitable”
to do so. In assessing this requirement, the statute includes
criteria, particularly focused on the spouses’ respective
“contributions” and “needs”. This approach is similar to
the property sharing provisions of some provinces in
Canada, although most provincial statutes in Canada create
a principle of “equal sharing” that establishes a baseline for

29

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 151. Although Australia’s Family
Law Act initially provided for property sharing for married couples
only, the same regime was extended to eligible “de facto” (cohabiting)
couples in 2008: see Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial
Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth), 2008/115.

30

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 151.
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the exercise of judicial discretion.31 By contrast, no such
statutory guidance exists in Australia’s legislation, and an
early precedent established that the concept of equal shares
was not the “starting point” in the exercise of judicial
discretion there.32 In this context, the authors suggest that
the cases reflect how “judicial authority to alter individual
interests in property is a radical departure from the
approach to property acquisition and entitlement found in
property law more generally [because] a central tenet of
capitalist liberal societies is that property has economic or
money value and those who can pay for it, own it.”33
In this context, Australian courts seem to have
considered business activities as more valuable than nonfinancial caregiving work and have tended to allocate
property interests accordingly. In In the Marriage of
Ferraro, for example, a trial judge divided significant
family wealth so that the husband (who had experienced
considerable success in business) received 70% and the
wife (who had cared for the home and children) received
31

See e.g. Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. Subsection 81(a) provides
that both partners are entitled to property and responsible for debts and
(b) creates an undivided half interest in all property as tenants in
common at separation. Section 85 provides for excluding some
property, such as pre-marriage property, inheritances, and gifts.
Section 65 permits a court to reallocate property interests in accordance
with “fairness,” and subsection 95(2) provides a list of factors to be
considered in relation to an “unequal division”; the test is “significant
unfairness.”

32

Mallet v Mallet, [1984] HCA 21, 156 CLR 605.

33

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 158–59. The authors indicate that
the omission of any justification in the Family Law Act for this “radical
departure” has created dissatisfaction for both men and women at
separation: ibid at 159.
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30%; the judge expressly rejected the wife’s claim for an
equal share, stating that an allocation of equal shares in this
case would be:
. . . akin to treating the contributions of the
creator of Sissinghurst Gardens, whose
breadth of vision and imagination, talent,
drive and endeavours led to the creation of
. . . most beautiful gardens in England, with
that of the gardener who assisted with the
tilling of the soil and the weeding of the
beds.34
By contrast, Canadian statutes tend to require equal
sharing of property as the starting point, although judicial
discretion may still result in unequal shares.35 For the
authors of The Family in Law, it is this reliance on judicial
discretion to achieve “just and equitable” outcomes that
represents a major flaw in Australia’s current statutory
34

In the Marriage Of: Renata Ferraro Appellant/Wife and Ruggero
Ferraro Respondent/Husband, [1992] FamCA 64 at para 139, 16 Fam
LR 1 at 28. The appeal court altered the wife’s share to 37.5%, while
confirming the decision in Mallet that there was no presumption of
equality as a starting point: The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 171.

35

See e.g. Martin v Martin (1992), 67 BCLR (2d) 219, 1992 CarswellBC
137 (WL Can) (BCCA), decided pursuant to earlier legislation in
British Columbia. Some provinces, such as Ontario, have statutes
based on “equalization of values” of property, with a compensating
money payment to the spouse whose net family property is the lesser
in value. In this context, litigation often focuses on whether property
can be “excluded” from the calculation: see e.g. Caratun v Caratun
(1992), 42 RFL (3d) 113, 1992 CarswellOnt 287 (WL Can), where the
Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the value of the husband’s dental
degree because it was not traditional property and its valuation for
purposes of equalization would be “unfairly speculative”.
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regime. However, after considering whether different
statutory guidelines might create better outcomes, the
authors conclude that the fundamental problem is the
conception of the family as a private unit, thus requiring
the full cost of relationship breakdown to be borne by the
spouses. As they suggest, “this assumption sits uneasily
with the reality of dependencies created through the sexual
division of labour, and it also absolves the state from
establishing a safety net that sufficiently provides for the
financially vulnerable party.”36 Clearly, these conclusions
may be equally apt in Canada, even where there are
statutory guidelines and a starting point of “equal shares”,
perhaps especially for the poorest and most vulnerable
families. For the authors, fundamental reform of family
property requires acknowledgement of societal structures
that work to create dependencies:
[T]he study of family law has to be combined
with study of other laws and disciplines so
that the institutions that continue to view the
worker as an unencumbered individual, with
no caretaking responsibilities, can be
changed. . . . [A] conception of a fair family
law may require that policy-makers address
the causes and consequences of the
diminished earning capacity of caregivers,
rather than only devising property ownership
regimes.37

36

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 177.

37

Ibid at 189.
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The Family in Law represents a formidable
accomplishment in its comprehensive and knowledgeable
assessment of the need for fundamental reform of law’s
role in relation to a wide range of issues for families in
Australia. The book provides extensive references to legal
and interdisciplinary commentary on family law principles
and processes, along with an engaged and critical
assessment of the need to reform Australian statutes and
judicial approaches in cases. Although the book’s
organization presents its discussion in three parts (Chapters
1–2 focus on theoretical ideas about law and the family and
family law institutions; Chapters 3–10 focus on marriage,
divorce, and corollary matters; while Chapters 11–12 focus
on abortion, child protection, adoption, and reproductive
technologies), the organization appears to replicate a
primary emphasis on issues relating to marriage and
divorce. To some extent, this emphasis is inevitable in the
context of the current law, of course —and the authors’
focus on child support in the wider context of social
security offers an often under-analyzed approach to
economic security.
At the same time, the authors might find it
interesting to explore the arrangement of one of Canada’s
family law books for students: its title is Families and the
Law (not Family Law). Its content reflects the diversity of
families and the crucial relationship between “private”
ordering and “public” policy, especially in relation to race,
class and gender, and economic security; and its
organization traces the law’s relationship to families in
three sequential developments:
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the creation of families (including
marriage and cohabitation, but also
parenting in relation to biological birth,
adoption and reproductive technology);
the regulation by law of ongoing
(intact) families (including child care
arrangements, child protection, family
violence, and elder abuse); and
the dissolution of families (divorce,
agreements,
dispute
resolution,
property, and spousal and child
support.38

As these comments suggest, The Family in Law
creates an excellent opportunity for conversations about
families and law among lawyers, judges, and legal
academics in Australia and Canada. Although these
conversations have often occurred in the past, the existence
of the review by the Australian Law Reform Commission
and the introduction of reform of Canada’s Divorce Act just
a few months later may present a new opportunity for
rethinking the essential nature of law’s relationship to
families, and the potential for reforms that address
fundamental needs for families. As Susan Boyd suggested
some years ago:
[We need] to study the efficacy of legal
change vis-à-vis the family in light of the
38

Mary Jane Mossman et al, Families and the Law: Cases and
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015). See also
Susan B Boyd, Book Review of Families and the Law: Cases and
Commentary by Mary Jane Mossman, (2012–13) 28:1 Can J Fam L
105 re an earlier edition of Families and the Law.
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wider social context . . . [and to be reminded]
that what legislation and judges say is not
always an accurate description of reality, due
to the sometimes false assumptions which
our legal system contains about the family
and family members. Students can learn to
take a critical perspective on policy-oriented
legal approaches which ignore the complex
nature of social change, of which legal
change is only one part.39
Shifting legal and policy makers’ views from a
narrow focus on dispute resolution to a more fundamental
understanding of the ways in which it is “families” that
create and sustain the fabric of communities, the viability
of the State, and the well-being of all of us as individuals
is not an easy task. For those involved in rethinking law’s
relationship to families in Canada and Australia, however,
The Family in Law is both essential and inspiring. As the
authors suggested, “[T]he choices we make can be
constrained by contextual factors, but they can also mean
the difference between contributing to oppressive practices
and promoting fairer laws and policies that are responsive
to the needs of disadvantaged groups in our society.”40
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Susan B Boyd, “Teaching Policy Issues in Family Law” (1989) 8:1
Can J Fam L 1 at 15 (editorial).

40

The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 434.

